Although born among us, our general instinctive feeling testifies that they are not wholly of us. So separate has been their social life, due alike to their clannishness and to our reserve; so strong have been the ties of race and blood and religion with them; so acute has been the jealousy of their spiritual teachers to our institutions-that we think of them, and speak of them, as foreigners.
Scholars have also noted relatively high fertility levels among the descendants of immigrants before World War I. Virtually every historical study of the fertility of second-generation women in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries has found that their fertility levels were higher than those of native women of native parentage, but lower than those of foreign-born women.4 Such findings not only substantiate the contentions of Victorian investigators but also suggest a smooth linear relationship between family limitation and American assimilation.
There are at least two plausible rationales for hypothesizing a negative relationship between level of fertility and degree of American assimilation. First, some theorists have linked family limitation to a "modern" outlook, and rapid industrialization and urbanization in the United States might have fostered such a "modern" mentality. By contrast, most of the immigrants arriving in the United States during the last decades of the nineteenth century came from "traditional" rural communities. Second, a decline in fertility began exceptionally early among the American population, around the beginning of the nineteenth century; a comparable decline did not occur in most European countriesincluding those from which most immigrants came-until the i87os or later.5 This paper reexamines the basis for Victorian fears of race suicide-the differential fertility of immigrant women, nativeborn women of foreign parentage, and native-born women of native parentage. The analysis is based on the I900 Public Use Sample, a national random sample of households drawn from the federal census, which includes information on the fertility of over 
22,000
women between the ages of 15 and 44.6 Our study reports fertility differentials at the turn of the century and explores the determinants of contrasting levels of childbearing.
The results show that overall fertility levels cannot be explained by the degree of American assimilation. We found that second-generation women experienced strikingly low overall fertility, relative to both foreign-born women and native-born women of native parentage. Moreover, the data indicate that the ethnic population had lower fertility than the third-generation native-born population. These unexpected findings are shown in Table I , which presents three age-standardized measures of fertility for native-born women of native-born parentage (nativenative women); native-born women with at least one foreignborn parent (second-generation women); and foreign-born women. The native-native women are also broken down by race, since the Victorian theorists of race suicide would have drawn no comfort from the high fertility of native-born blacks.
The first column of Table I shows the child-woman ratio, which is the measure of fertility most commonly used in historical studies of census data. Although this ratio is the best available indicator of recent fertility, it has the disadvantage that it is influenced not only by fertility, but also by maternal and child mortality and by rates of coresidence between mothers and children. The mean number of children ever born to women, given in the second column, is a simple and reliable measure of past fertility, but it is insensitive to recent fertility because it reflects mainly the fertility of older women, who have the greatest number of children ever born. The third column presents a somewhat unusual measure-average number of children born per year of potential fertility. This statistic was calculated by dividing the number of children ever born to each woman under age forty-five by the number of years she had lived since age fifteen. The mean number of children per year is roughly comparable to a general fertility rate. We chose this measure to accommodate the retrospective nature of the children-ever-born data; unlike the simple measure of children ever born, it is not determined primarily by the experience of older women. The mean number of children-per-year measure is expressed in terms of index numbers in the fourth column of Table I.7 7 Much of the following analysis relies on retrospective reports of the cumulative fertility of women who were between I5 and 45 years of age in I900. We have placed less emphasis on other measures more appropriate for capturing recent fertility trends, such as childwoman ratios. We have employed own-children methods (which use the ages of children enumerated in the household for inferring fertility histories) primarily to allow comparison of our findings with those of other researchers and for the analysis of birth intervals and the cessation of childbearing (see Table 5 ). We chose to rely primarily on reports of children ever born for two reasons. First, the primary focus of this research is not longor short-term change in childbearing practices, but rather differences in the past fertility of women who were of childbearing age in I900. Children-ever-born data were most appropriate for the latter topic. Second, we wanted to avoid the potential biases in statistics based on children present in the household. Own-children estimates are affected by the mortality of children and of women of childbearing age. Because little information on Overall, immigrants did have higher fertility than nativeborn women. But, when we consider the fertility of the daughters of immigrants-the "home-grown foreigners"-the results sharply contradict both previous demographic research and the Victorian prophets of race suicide. Regardless of the measure employed, Table I indicates that second-generation women had substantially lower fertility than any other group, including the native-native women. Such low fertility among second-generation women contradicts any simple linear relationship between assimilation and fertility control. These results also force us to reevaluate nativist warnings of race suicide. When we combine the foreign-born with the secondgeneration women (All ethnics in Table I ), we find that the overall fertility of immigrants and their children was substantially lower than that of native-born women of native parentage. In other words, the fears of contemporary observers were misplaced; "native Americans" were reproducing faster than the "foreign stock" of immigrants and their children, and the net effect of immigration was to reduce fertility levels around the turn of the century.
In Table I There was little or no evidence of such downward bias in the I900 census data, save for women well beyond the age of childbearing. 8 Child immigrants are those foreign-born women who had immigrated when they were ten years old or younger; adult immigrants had immigrated when they were eleven or older. Missing data on year of immigration for 431 immigrants were imputed by allocating the year of immigration of the preceding immigrant with a nonmissing year of immigration. Missing data for the variable on years in the U.S. were imputed by means of a hotdeck procedure. The hypothesis that assimilation led to family limitation is supported by the finding that child immigrants, who were introduced to American norms at a more impressionable age, had fewer children than did adult immigrants, a fact which suggests that exposure to American customs encouraged family limitation. In addition, second-the theory that ethnic fertility levels declined with assimilation. But they also create the impression that the second generation was more assimilated than the native-native population itself.
We initially thought that the low fertility of second-generation women relative to the foreign-born might reflect differences in the ethnic composition of the two groups. Certainly, there were changes in the "racial stock" of the foreign-born population after 1880; intellectuals and reformers repeatedly warned that the "Slav, Latin, and Asiatic races, historically downtrodden, atavistic, and stagnant" would overwhelm "British, German, and Scandinavian stock, historically free, energetic, and progressive."9
In Table 2 , the mean number of children born per year was broken down by generation and ethnic group in order to test whether greater representation of "old" immigrants among the second-generation women could account for their low fertility.10 generation women with two foreign-born parents had higher cumulative fertility than did American-born women with one foreign-born parent. A similar pattern emerges if we also take into account the birthplaces of the husbands and parents-in-law of secondgeneration women; the average number of children ever born rises as the proportion of foreign-born relatives and in-laws increases. But the critical exception to this pattern-the low fertility of second-generation women relative to native-native women-must not be overlooked. 9 Prescott F. Hall, "Immigration and the Educational Test," North American Review, CLXV (1897), 395, quoted in Solomon, Ancestors and Immigrants, III. Io The ethnicity of women born outside the United States was assigned on the basis of their own birthplaces. A second-generation woman with two foreign-born parents was classified on the basis of her mother's birthplace, in accordance with the practice followed As anticipated, the "new" immigrants-those from southern and eastern Europe-had higher fertility than the "old" immigrants from Ireland, Germany, and elsewhere in northern Europe. However, within each ethnic group, there was a substantial drop in fertility between the first generation and the second generation, and, in almost every group, second-generation fertility was lower than native-native fertility. Among the "old" immigrant groups, even the foreign-born had lower fertility than native-born women of native parentage.
The shift from "old" immigrants to "new" immigrants accounts for less than one fourth of the observed fertility differences between second-generation and foreign-born women. The "new" immigrants were simply not numerous enough in I900 to have much impact on ethnic fertility: only Io percent of the foreignborn and second-generation women could trace their origins to southern or eastern Europe. Moreover, the few southern and eastern European second-generation women had substantially lower fertility than foreign-born women from the same regions.
Thus the central question remains: why did second-generation women have so few children, compared with both nativenative and foreign-born women? One approach to the issue is to investigate the extent to which second-generation women differed from native-native and foreign-born women when matched on three characteristics. Table 3 gives a breakdown of the number of children born per year for the three groups of women by rural/ urban residence, region, and occupational status.1l The three columns on the right of the table show the frequency distribution of each group. Compared with native-native women, the ethnics more often resided in cities and in the northeastern and north central regions of the country, and fewer of them were farmers.
Among all three generational groups, residents of rural areas, the South, and the West, and farmers had the highest fertility; therefore both second-generation and foreign-born women were concentrated in low fertility areas.
by the U.S. Census Bureau at the turn of the century. If a second-generation woman had a native-born mother and a foreign-born father, her ethnicity was determined by her father's birthplace. iI Rural residence is defined as residence in a locality of under I,ooo population. The regional categories are defined according to the standard census bureau classification system. The occupational classification is described in Ruggles, "The Demography of the Unrelated Individual," Demography, XXV (I988), 521-536. To assess whether the differences in fertility between the three groups would disappear if the groups had the same age composition and shared the same distributions of rural/urban residence, region, and occupation, we carried out a decomposition analysis (see Table 4 ).12 The upper panel decomposes the differences between native-native and second-generation women, and the lower panel decomposes the differences between the foreign-born and second-generation women. The absolute differences between 12 We adopted the decomposition technique proposed by P. Table 4 indicate that if the second-generation women and the native-native women had identical distributions of age, residence, region, and occupation, and everything else were equal, then the difference in fertility between the two groups would diminish by 76.5 percent. The most important factor is rural/urban residence, which accounts for 39 percent of the difference, followed by region, which accounts for 26 percent.
The large effect of factors in the upper panel of Table 4 does not mean that the factors actually explain the low fertility of the second generation. After all, the foreign-born were similar to the second generation in their residence, region, and occupational status, and they had very high fertility. As can be seen in the lower panel of Table 4 , the only factor that helps to explain the difference between second-generation and foreign-born women is age. What this analysis shows is that ethnics-both foreignborn and second-generation-resided in those parts of the United States that were characterized by low native-native fertility. Compared with their native-native neighbors, therefore, the fertility of second-generation women was not exceptionally low.
To understand why second-generation women had fewer children, it is helpful to examine some of the proximate determinants of fertility. To oversimplify, fertility is determined by three factors: starting, spacing, and stopping.13 Each of these factors is explored in Table 5 .
In Western societies, the onset of childbearing is usually determined by marriage. Some people never get married, and among those who marry some remain childless, but for most women childbearing begins shortly after marriage. There were striking differences in age at marriage and the proportion never marrying among the native-native, second-generation, and foreign-born women in 900o. The top panel of Table 5 shows the age-standardized distribution of marital status for each group, together with the indirect median age at marriage, the overall percentage never marrying, and the percentage of ever-married The scheme that we adopted reflects the limitations of census data. Two other potential influences on fertility levels-illegitimacy and separation of spouses-are not analyzed in the text because they did not appear to be significant determinants of fertility differentials among the groups studied. Reported fertility of never-married women was extremely low in 900o. The percentage of nevermarried women who had borne children in each group was as follows: native-native women, .02%; second-generation women, .07%; child immigrants, .27%; and adult immigrants, .27%. There was little difference beween groups in the percentage of currently married women with spouse absent, in the frequency of divorce, or in the proportion of currently widowed women in each age group between 15-19 and 40-44. women who remained childless.14 The differences in marriage patterns are consistent with the fertility differentials shown in Table I . The second-generation women, with the lowest fertility, married later and remained single much more frequently than either of the other groups. The other determinants of fertility shown in Table 5 -spacing and stopping-cannot help to explain the low fertility of the second generation. To minimize truncation bias, we used the lifetable approach to the measurement of birth intervals. Only small differences between groups emerged, and those small differences are inconsistent with the observed differences in fertility. In fact, second-generation women appear to have had slightly shorter birth intervals than the native-native women. Stopping was estimated by measuring the mean age of the forty-five-to fortynine-year-old mothers at the birth of their last child. This measure has considerable potential for selection bias, but given the limitations of the data it is probably the best that can be done.15 Once again, the differences between groups are minimal. The foreignborn women had their last child about a year after the other groups, which may indicate that fewer of them were limiting their families through contraception.
In sum, marital patterns-age at marriage and proportion marrying-are the only plausible mechanisms to explain the low fertility of the second generation. To confirm this, Table 6 provides several measures of marital fertility. The first column shows the child-woman ratio for married women. This measure does not fully account for differences in the marriage patterns of different groups, since it is based on fertility experience during the previous five years, but does not control for marital status during that period. The second column gives the mean number of chil-15 The life-table approach to measuring birth intervals involves calculating the proportion of women at risk of having given birth by month x who actually gave birth by that month; these proportions are then treated as "survival rates." The sample was restricted to women who had completed the interval in question and whose previous birth (or marriage) had occurred at least x months before the census. To minimize the effects of mortality and children leaving home, the analysis was further restricted to women with all children born still present in the household. The latter restriction creates the potential for selection bias, since women with very large intervals are more likely to have older children, and older children will have a greater chance of having died or left home. Since the children of immigrants left home later than did other groups, there may be a small relative overstatement of the birth-intervals of the foreign-born. dren-ever-born for married women. Again, since children-ever born is a retrospective measure of fertility, this measure does not fully capture the effects of differing marital patterns. The third column of Table 6 shows a more precise measure: the mean number of children born per year of marriage. This measure is also based on the children-ever-born variable in the census, but it controls for past marital experience: it is simply the number of children ever born to married women divided by duration of marriage. The measure is analogous to an age-standardized marital fertility rate.16 The fourth column of Table 6 expresses the mean number of children per year of marriage in index numbers.
The results indicate that the marital fertility of second-generation women was virtually identical to that of white nativenative women, once we control for differences in age structure and marital duration. In Table I , the number of children born per year was 31 percent higher for white native-native than for second-generation women; in contrast, the index of children per year of marriage is virtually identical in the two groups.
Differences in marriage practices also account for some, but not all, of the fertility gap between second-generation women and foreign-born women. The mean number of children ever born per year shown in Table I was 37 percent higher for adult immigrants than for second-generation women; the mean number of children born per year of marriage in Table 6 was only I6 percent higher.
The findings presented so far can be summarized as follows:
(I) Contrary to the contention of Victorian nativists, immigrants and their children actually lowered American fertility levels around the turn of the century, because of the extremely low fertility of second-generation ethnics. (2) The low fertility of second-generation women relative to the foreign born cannot be accounted for by differences in the ethnic makeup of the two groups. (3) Second-generation and foreign-born women were concentrated in northern cities, where native-native fertility was lowest. Foreign-born women had similar economic incentives to work and similar cultural imperatives to support their kin, but far fewer of them had parents who resided in the United States. Indeed, many foreign-born women had married before they immigrated. The issue of parental obligations was therefore less important for foreign-born women than for native-born women.
The data on employment and residence with parents support the interpretation that second-generation women often delayed marriage because of their duties to their family of origin. The top section of Table 7 shows the proportion of women who resided with their parents and worked for wages. Overall, such behavior was almost 60 percent more common among second-generation single women than among either native-native or foreign-born women. The pattern was not merely a consequence of differing marital patterns; when we restrict the analysis to single women, the same basic relationship emerges.
The lower panel of Table 7 uses a synthetic cohort to estimate the mean number of years that women between the ages of fifteen and forty-four lived with their parents, worked, and both lived at home and worked.19 The second-generation women spent more time living with their parents than either of the other groups.
Foreign-born women had the longest period of employment, but the briefest period of residence with their parents, whereas the native-native women had a moderate period of residence with parents and a short period of employment. Overall, the secondgeneration women worked and resided with their parents 98 percent longer than white native-native women and 62 percent longer than the foreign-born. More than 95 percent of these secondgeneration women were single.
In sum, the evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that many second-generation women delayed or avoided marriage so that they could remain at home with their parents. The daughters of native-born parents probably had less economic and social pressure to stay with their parents, whereas many fewer of the foreign-born women had local parents with whom they could reside. This hypothesis is not the only possible explanation for the late marriage and low fertility of second-generation women; further investigation may uncover additional economic or cultural barriers to marriage for these women. Whatever the explanation for the marriage patterns of second-generation women, one conclusion is inescapable: the much- , 1926) , XIV, 151-166. Differences in age structure may also have contributed to contemporaries' sense that native-born Americans were dying away. As a group, foreign-born women were older than nativeborn women, and immigrants had thus had greater opportunities to raise large families. Another factor that was generally ignored in the late-nineteenth-century rhetoric on race suicide was the higher mortality of the immigrant population. The I900 census incorporates a variable on the number of children surviving, which can be compared with the variable on children ever born to estimate relative mortality. It turns out that the differences in mortality between the children of white native-born women of native parentage and second-generation women were very small, but the children of foreign-born women experienced substantially higher mortality. two elements of the native population, he would have found that the immigrant element is dying out faster than the native population." No one paid much attention to Commons' argument, and by the time detailed fertility statistics confirming his thesis were released in 1943, race suicide was no longer a burning issue.25 It would be a mistake to ascribe the rise of the ideology of race suicide to a lack of adequate statistical data. Most of the writers on the topic made no reference to statistics. These authors typically resided in northeastern cities that they could see were becoming foreign, and they knew from firsthand experience that middle-class natives were postponing or foregoing marriage for "selfish" economic motives. Race suicide was typically viewed in moral terms, not quantitative ones. Theodore Roosevelt put it this way:
The fundamental, the unpardonable crime against the race is the crime of race suicide. The New England of the future will belong, and ought to belong, to the descendants of the immigrants of yesterday and today, because the descendants of the Puritans "have lacked the courage to live," have lacked the conscience which ought to make men and women fulfill the primary law of their being.26
The moral argument was reinforced by fears of genetic pollution. Nativist spokesmen therefore feared not only the large families of immigrant couples but also interbreeding which might "dilute the Yankee gumption . . . childbearing by immigrants and their descendants seem threatening. Thus, the reproduction of foreign stock constituted a danger in itself, a danger that would have been feared even if contemporaries had known that immigrants and their offspring actually had lower fertility than did the native population.
